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The key issue in the hedonic price theory is that although the literature 
emphasises intrinsic nonlinearity in the relationship between house 
prices and housing characteristics, very little theoretical guidance is 
provided with regards to a more appropriate mathematical specification 
for the hedonic price function. Thus, most empirical studies make use 
of flexible functional forms or simple linear models which possess a 
direct economic meaningfulness. This theoretical paper attempts to fill 
this gap by using the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model to show 
the nonlinearity of the hedonic price function and provide insights on 
the more appropriate functional relationship between prices and 
attributes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although the economic theory of hedonic prices (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 
1974) is well known and not in question,1 it provides very little theoretical 
guidance on the appropriate functional relationship between prices and 
attributes in the hedonic price function (Malpezzi, 2003; Taylor, 2003), and 
thus in empirical studies, researchers have used flexible functional forms, 
such as Box-Cox functions, or simple parametric models (Anglin and Gençay, 
1996).2 
 
The hedonic price literature almost unanimously underlines the intrinsic 
nonlinearity in the relationship between house prices and housing 
characteristics, though nothing is known a priori about a specific functional 
form (Anglin and Gençay, 1996; Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim, 2002, 
2004; Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar, 2007; Haupt, Schnurbus and 
Tschernig, 2010). Nevertheless, while the literature suggests that the 
equilibrium price function is nonlinear, most empirical studies make use of 
linear models, thus relying on an influential simulation study by Cropper, 
Deck and McConnell (1988). 3  This “puzzle” is due to the absence of 
theoretical groundwork with regards to the more appropriate functional form 
to use in the hedonic price models (see for e.g., Anglin and Gençay, 1996; 
Malpezzi, 2003). According to Rosen (1974), there is no reason for the 
hedonic price function to be linear; in fact, the linearity of the hedonic price 
function is unlikely as long as the marginal cost of attributes increases for 
sellers and it is not possible to untie packages. Indeed, Ekeland, Heckman and 
Nesheim (2002, 2004) demonstrate that nonlinearity is a generic property of 
the hedonic price function. Hence, a linear model would be a special case for 
the hedonic price function (Kuminoff, Parmeter and Pope, 2008, 2009). 
However, the nonlinearity is basically a general concept and may imply the 
use of several kinds of empirical models. 
 
As a rule, the use of a particular empirical model rather than another should be 
indicated by the economic theory (Stock and Watson, 2003). Indeed, 
theoretical models are critical in determining an accurate and consistent 
econometric model: empirical analysis alone cannot replace conceptual 
reasoning when estimating the relationships of most economic phenomena 
(Can, 1992; Brown and Ethridge, 1995). 
                                                        
1 For an exhaustive overview see Sheppard (1999) and Malpezzi (2003). 
2 Often linear, semi-logarithmic or log-log models are chosen. These are characterised 
as being easily interpretable, and the estimated parameters possess a direct economic 
meaningfulness (Maurer, Pitzer, and Sebastian, 2004). In particular, in the linear 
model, the parameters give absolute prices for the unit of the attributes. 
3  Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988) have found that when all attributes are 
observed, linear and quadratic Box-Cox forms produce the most accurate estimates of 
marginal attribute prices; whereas, when some attributes are unobserved or are 
replaced by proxies, linear and linear Box-Cox functions perform best. 
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In order to build a theoretical foundation for empirical models, this paper 
develops a matching model à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see for e.g., the 
textbook by Pissarides, 2000) and shows that the hedonic pricing equation is 
nonlinear. In particular, under the realistic assumption of decentralised 
housing markets with important search and matching frictions (Leung and 
Zhang, 2011), in this model, the equilibrium price function is nonlinear with a 
closed-form solution. Furthermore, this paper provides empirical evidence for 
the non­linear effect of housing characteristics on selling price. 
 
Several papers have examined the widely used hedonic pricing equation (see 
for e.g., Epple, 1987; Bartik, 1987; Kahn and Lang, 1988; Palmquist, 1988; 
Brachinger, 2003; Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim, 2002, 2004). Moreover, 
there have been attempts to develop a dynamic theory of hedonic prices 
(Kwong and Leung, 2000; Kan, Kwong and Leung, 2004; Leung, Wong and 
Cheung, 2007).4 However, these important contributions did not consider the 
search and matching frictions. In fact, what distinguishes my paper from 
previous efforts is that it is based on a search­matching model, arguably more 
appropriate for a “matching market” like the housing market.5 
 
Also, the proposed housing market matching model allows a major drawback 
of the standard hedonic pricing theory to be overcome: the assumption of 
competitive markets. Indeed, in the standard hedonic pricing theory, markets 
are assumed to be sufficiently thick (i.e. markets with a large amount of 
trading) so that implicit or hedonic prices, i.e. the shadow prices of the 
characteristics, are revealed to economic agents through trades that differ only 
in terms of a single attribute. However, this is hardly true: markets become 
increasingly thin when traded goods are increasingly heterogeneous, and the 
implicit or hedonic prices as well as the "true" market value of the good are 
not known (Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2003; Harding, Knight and 
Sirmans, 2003; Cotteleer and Gardebroek, 2006).6 In fact, the house price 
                                                        
4 In particular, Leung, Wong and Cheung (2007) have developed a dynamic theory of 
hedonic prices based on the general equilibrium asset pricing model à la Lucas which 
holds not only at the steady state, but in principle at any point in time. 
5 Peters (2007) has developed a suitably modified version of hedonic equilibrium by 
using the limits of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium from finite versions of the game to 
determine the out of equilibrium payoffs. The goal of this paper is to address a realistic 
situation in which characteristics of traders on both sides of the market are 
endogenous. This formalisation can be applied to any matching markets (labour, 
marriage and housing). 
6 According to Arnott (1989), the real estate market is thin because of the indivisibility 
and multi-dimensional heterogeneity of housing units. Although the model is extended 
to treat costly search, central in Arnott's (1989) modelling framework is the analysis of 
tenant search and landlord behaviour in a (rental) market with tenant idiosyncratic 
tastes. Thin (rental) markets are in fact modelled by assuming an idiosyncratic 
component to the tastes of households over housing units. Given such idiosyncratic 
tastes, tenants search for their preferred unit and are willing to pay a premium for it. 
This confers monopoly power on landlords, which they exploit by setting rents above 
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realistically depends not only on the housing characteristics but also the 
search and matching frictions and bargaining power of the parties. Indeed, 
several recent papers have just used the search-matching models to study the 
housing market (among others, Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; 
Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and Zhang, 
2011; Peterson, 2012). However, none of these existing works of research 
have considered how to take advantage of this approach to derive an 
appropriate functional form for the hedonic price equation.7 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the housing 
market matching model; Section 3 gives insights on a more appropriate 
functional form to use in the hedonic price models, while Section 4 shows the 
empirical plausibility of the theoretical result; and finally, Section 5 concludes 
the work. 
 
 
2. A Baseline Matching Model of Housing Market 
 
I have adopted a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see 
for e.g., Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash 
bargaining. I believe that the behaviour of the housing market can be properly 
formalised by the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model. Indeed, the random 
matching assumption is absolutely compatible with a market where the formal 
distinction between the demand and supply side is very subtle; whereas, 
bargaining is a natural outcome of thin, local and decentralised markets for 
heterogeneous goods. 
 
Since I am interested in selling price, the market of reference is the 
homeownership market rather than the rental market. In this market, if a 
contract is legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return 
to the circumstances that preceded the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct 
contractual relationship is set up. In matching model jargon, this means that 
the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller match does not exist and the 
value of an occupied home for a seller is simply given by the selling price. 
 
Buyers (b) expend costly search efforts to find a (new or better) house, while 
sellers (s) hold h 2  houses of which h 1  are on the market, i.e. vacancies 
( v ) are simply given by     v h 1 s 0 .8 It is therefore possible that a 
                                                                                                                         
costs. In the long run, however, free entry and exit lead to zero profits, with vacancies 
as the equilibrating mechanism. 
7 Unlike the quoted studies, I have followed the standard matching framework à la 
Mortensen-Pissarides without any deviation from the baseline model. 
8 Since there is no rental market, this is a reasonable assumption. Alternatively, one 
could assume that the sellers hold h  1 houses of which h are on the market, and that 
the buyers are the homeless. This case would not change the results of the analysis. 
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buyer can become a seller, and that a seller can become a buyer. Indeed, 
buyers today are in fact potential sellers tomorrow (Leung, Leong and Wong, 
2006). 
 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of buying a house (H ) are 
given by:9 
       rV c q θ P V                                          (1)         rH e g θ x H P                                    (2) 
where θ v / b  is the housing market tightness from the standpoint of sellers, 
while  q θ  and  g θ  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of 
filling a vacant house and of buying a home. The standard hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale in the matching function,  m m v,b , is adopted 
(see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), since it is also used in 
(recent) search models of the housing market (Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Novy-
Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung 
and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). Hence, the properties of these functions are 
straightforward:   q' θ 0  and   g' θ 0 . 10  The terms c  and e  represent, 
respectively, the costs sustained by sellers for the advertisement of vacancies 
and the effort (in monetary terms) made by buyers to find and visit the largest 
possible number of houses. If a contract is stipulated, the risk neutral buyer 
gets a linear benefit x from the property, which coincides with the value of the 
house (abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the 
seller (who abandons the value of finding another buyer). Intuitively, the value 
of the house, and thus the buyer’s benefit, can be higher or lower according to 
the mix of desired and undesidered housing characteristics (not all 
characteristics are in fact desired).11 For the sake of simplicity, I assume that 
all characteristics are desired. Hence, more housing characteristics mean 
higher house value (i.e. the buyer’s benefit). 
 
The endogenous variables that are simultaneously determined at equilibrium 
are market tightness (θ ) and sale price (P ). The “zero-profit” or “free-entry” 
condition normally used by matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) yields the 
first key relationship of the model, in which market tensions are a positive 
                                                        
9 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the 
future at an exogenous interest rate r > 0. As usual in matching-type models, the 
analysis is restricted to a stationary state. 
10 Standard technical assumptions are postulated:       θ 0 θlim q θ lim g θ , and 
     θ 0 θlim g θ lim q θ 0 . By definition, markets with frictions require positive 
and finite tightness, i.e.   0 θ , since for θ 0  the vacancies are always filled, 
whereas for  θ  the home-seekers immediately find a vacant house. 
11 Air and noise pollution, bad neighbourhoods are examples of “undesidered” housing 
characteristics which decrease the value of the house. 
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function of price. 12  By using the equilibrium condition V 0  in (1), the 
following is obtained:  
   
 11 Pq θ
q θ c                                           
(3)
 
with   θ / P 0 . This positive relationship is very intuitive (recall that 
  q' θ 0 ): in fact, if the price increases, more vacancies will be on the 
market. 
 
Instead, the selling price is obtained by solving the following optimisation 
condition, the so-called Nash bargaining solution usually used for 
decentralised markets (recall that in equilibrium V 0 ): 
        γ 1 γP argmax  P V x H P  
  
     
γP x H P
1 γ     P γ x H  
where  0 γ 1  is the share of bargaining power of sellers. Entering into a 
contractual agreement obviously implies that x H , θ  for the buyer. 
Hence, the selling price is always positive. By using the previous result, i.e. 
      1 γx H P Pγ , in Equation (2), eventually we get an explicit 
expression for the selling price: 
 
   
    
γ rx e
P
r g θ 1 γ                                          
(4)
 
 
with   P / θ 0 . With regards to the economic meaning of Equation (4), if 
the market tightness increases, the effect of the well-known congestion 
externalities on the sellers’ side (see Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price 
(recall that   g' θ 0 ). 
 
This simple model is able to reproduce the observed joint behaviour of prices 
and time-on-the-market (see for e.g., Leung, Leong, and Chan, 2002). In fact, 
with a probability of filling a vacant house of  q θ , the (expected) time-on-
the-market is  1q θ . Hence, from Equation (3), the house with a higher 
selling price has a longer time on the market (since  1q θ  is increasing in 
θ ); whereas, from Equation (4), a longer the time-on-the-market (i.e. higher 
market tightness) means a lower sale price. 
 
 
                                                        
12 The free entry condition for the sellers implies that there is no constraint on the 
number of sellers. In fact, in the model, anyone holding more than one house becomes 
a seller. 
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It is straightforward to obtain from (3) that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  
tends to zero (infinity), as  q θ  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given 
the negative slope of (4) and the fact that price is always positive, only one 
long-term equilibrium derived from the intersection of the two curves exists in 
the model. Finally, by normalising the population in the housing market to the 
unit,  1 b s , and using both the definition of vacancies,    v h 1 s , and 
the value of equilibrium tightness (  θ θ* v / b ), the model is closed in a 
very simple manner.13 
 
 
3. Hedonic Price and Functional Form Specification 
 
The two key equations of the model are the free-entry condition, i.e. Equation 
(3), and the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. Equation (4). Indeed, the latter is 
none other than the hedonic price function of the model, where the selling 
price is a positive function of housing characteristics. From (4), in fact, P  
depends positively on the value of the house, x, which in turn, positively 
depends on the housing characteristics. Hence, the hedonic or implicit price is 
positive and the equilibrium hedonic price function has a closed-form 
solution. 
 
However, unlike the standard hedonic price theory, the sale price of this model 
not only depends on the housing characteristics but also on the market 
tensions, bargaining power of the parties and search costs. In particular, 
market tensions are an endogenous variable of the model. Hence, in order to 
express the hedonic price function only in terms of exogenous variables, 
Equations (3) and (4) need to be combined. By using the popular Cobb-
Douglas functional form (also used by Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and 
Schneider, 2009; Peterson, 2012), i.e.  1 α αm v b , where α is the elasticity of 
the matching function with respect to the share of buyers, the following 
implicit function is obtained for selling price: 
 

        
1 α
αPr P 1 ‐ γ P γrx γe
c
 
   

         
1 α
1α
α1r P P 1 ‐ γ γrx γe
c                 
(5)
 
with     1 α α αv bq θ θ
v
,   1  1 α α αv bg θ θ
b
, and     
1
αPθ
c
 from (3).  
                                                        
13 Given the equilibrium value of market tightness, it is in fact straightforward to solve 
this system of three equations with three unknowns (v, b, s). 
 Lisi    8 
 
The total differentiation of Equation (5) with respect to P  and x  thus yields: 
   

                
1 α
1 α1α1 1r dP P 1 ‐ γ dP γr dxα c  
 
   
           
1 α
α
dP γrp 0
dx 1 Pr 1 ‐ γα c
            
(6) 
As a result, the hedonic price function is non-linear even if the buyer is risk 
neutral and acquires a linear benefit from the property: in fact, the implicit or 
hedonic price p
 
depends on x , since  p f P
 
and  P f x . This is in line 
with the hedonic price literature which suggests that the equilibrium price 
function should be nonlinear. 
 
The key role of market tightness on the shape of the hedonic price function is 
straightforward: in fact, the selling price depends on the matching 
probabilities between seller and buyer which are, intuitively non-linear (for 
example, an increase in tightness increases at decreasing rates the probability 
of finding a home). Also, the equilibrium market tightness depends on housing 
characteristics through the selling price (see Equation 3). In short, housing 
characteristics affect the selling price, which in turn, influences market 
tightness; eventually, the variation of market tightness causes a further change 
in the selling price. Thus, the combination of these effects leads to the non-
linear effect of housing characteristics on house price. Precisely, the positive 
effect of an increase in housing characteristics is subsequently mitigated by 
market tightness. Indeed, since the selling price is increasing in the house 
value (namely, the hedonic price is positive), it may also be stated that 
  2 2d P / dx p' x 0 . Hence, this theoretical model also gives a precise 
statement about the form of the hedonic price function: in fact, it suggests an 
increasing relationship at decreasing rates between selling price and housing 
characteristics. 14
   
4. Empirical Testing 
 
In order to test the empirical plausibility of an increasing relationship at 
decreasing rates between selling price and housing characteristics, the 
benchmark parametric econometric model proposed by Anglin and Gençay 
(1996) is used, and also considered by Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar 
(2007), and Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig (2010).15 
                                                        
14 Note that the search effort of the buyer also affects the hedonic price, since P 
depends on e. 
15 Indeed, Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig (2010) show that the null hypothesis of the 
correct specification of the linear parametric model proposed by Anglin and Gençay 
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The Anglin-Gençay benchmark parametric model is characterised by many 
binary variables and the relationship between the dependent variable (selling 
price), the continuous regressor (the lot size) and the discrete variables is 
represented in terms of relative changes (elasticity). 16  In this empirical 
analysis, data from their study are employed. Details about this dataset are 
reported in the Appendix – Part I (at the end). 
 
By following the benchmark parametric model by Anglin and Gencay (1996), 
all the quantitative variables (lot size, bedrooms, bathrooms, stories) are 
transformed into natural logarithms; 17  whereas, the dummy variables, by 
definition, cannot be transformed (Maurer, Pitzer and Sebastian, 2004). The 
econometric model is thus the following: 
                   
            
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i
6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i 11 i i
ln P β β ln LOT β ln BED β ln BATH β ln STO β DRI
             β RER β FIB β GWH β CAC β PRN β GAR ε
                 (7) 
where iP  is the selling price of the house i ; DRI, RER, FIB, GWH, CAC and 
PRN are dummy variables for driveway, recreational room, finished basement, 
gas water heating, central air conditioning and preferred neighbourhood, 
respectively; GAR, BED, BATH and STO are the number of garages, 
bedrooms, full bathrooms and stories, respectively; and LOT is the lot size (in 
square feet). Finally, iε  is the stochastic error term. 
 
By neglecting the binary variables, 18  I focus on iβ , with  i 1, 2, 3, 4 . It 
follows that with  i0 β 1  the relationship is increasing at decreasing rates, 
while with iβ 1 , the relationship is increasing at increasing rates, and finally 
with iβ 1 , the relationship is linear. 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) results show that the coefficients iβ  have 
positive signs and are statistically significant, i.e. iβ 0 . Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                         
(1996), against the alternative of parametric misspecification, cannot be rejected at any 
reasonable significance level. Also, they show that the parametric model predicts better 
than the nonparametric specification proposed by Parmeter, Henderson and 
Kumbhakar (2007). 
16  Data on housing characteristics, in fact, typically consists of one continuous 
regressor (the lot size) and many ordered and unordered categorical variables 
(Parmeter, Henderson and Kumbhakar, 2007; Haupt, Schnurbus and Tschernig, 2010). 
17  The Box-Cox regression also suggests a logarithmic transformation for the 
quantitative variables. Because of the presence of the value 0, the natural logarithm is 
not used for the variable number of garage places. 
18 The coefficients for the binary variables give the surcharge which is to be paid 
relative to a property without those attributes. For more details about the economic 
interpretation of the effect of dummy variables on the dependent variable in natural 
logarithmic form see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). 
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coefficients iβ  range between 0.089 (number of bedrooms) and 0.313 (lot 
size), i.e.  i0 β 1 , and the null hypothesis of iβ 1  is rejected at any 
reasonable significance level, thus confirming the nonlinearity of the hedonic 
price function. Finally, not surprisingly, the econometric model is statistically 
correct (for details about the estimation results, see Appendix – Part II, at the 
end).19 Hence, an increasing relationship at decreasing rates may be the most 
appropriate functional form for the hedonic price function (as suggested by 
the theoretical model). 
 
Finally, this theoretical framework may also be used to study how errors in 
measuring marginal attribute prices vary with the form of the hedonic price 
function; in this way, the simulation strategy developed by Cropper, Deck and 
McConnell (1988), and updated by Kuminoff, Parmeter and Pope (2008, 
2009), may take the (equilibria of the) housing market with search and 
matching frictions into account, thus relaxing the unrealistic assumption of 
competitive housing markets.20 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The nonlinearity in the relationship between house price and housing 
characteristics is a recognised starting point for the hedonic price literature, 
although nothing is known a priori about a specific functional form. Indeed, 
the economic theory of hedonic prices provides very little theoretical guidance 
on the appropriate functional relationship between prices and attributes in the 
hedonic price function. This is a very significant shortcoming for empirical 
studies, since theoretical models are critical in determining accurate and 
consistent econometric models and the use of a particular empirical model 
rather than another should be indicated by the economic theory. As a 
consequence, most empirical studies make use of flexible functional forms or 
simple models which possess a direct economic meaningfulness. This paper 
develops a baseline matching model in which the nonlinearity of the hedonic 
price function emerges as an equilibrium outcome in a market with search and 
matching frictions. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence for the non­
linear effect of housing characteristics on selling price. 
 
                                                        
19 On the shape of the hedonic price function (precisely, on the estimate of the marginal 
price of floor space) see the interesting discussion between Coulson (1992, 1993) and 
Colwell (1993). 
20 In the quoted studies, the marginal bid of consumers (namely, the “true” marginal 
price paid) for each attribute is obtained by simulations of housing market equilibria. 
Subsequently, equilibrium housing prices, together with housing attributes, provide the 
data used to estimate various functional forms for the hedonic price function. Finally, 
errors in estimating marginal prices are calculated by comparing the consumer's 
equilibrium marginal bid with the gradient of the hedonic price function. 
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A drawback of this analysis, however, must be acknowledged: there is a “gap” 
between the theoretical model (which derives a complicated non-linear 
function) and its empirical counterpart (in which many binary regressors are 
used). It follows that the theoretical model introduces a number of parameters 
which cannot be tested for (above all, the bargaining power of the parties).21 
The explanation (justification) for this difference is that the aim of the 
empirical part of the paper is to offer clear evidence for the particular shape of 
the hedonic price function derived from the theoretical model. The empirical 
model used is in fact, a very popular econometric specification. Nevertheless, 
it would be desirable to verify these results by using another dataset and/or a 
more complex empirical model. 
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Appendix 
 
I) Data 
 
The dataset contains 546 observations on the sales prices of houses sold 
during July, August and September (1987) in the city of Windsor, Canada 
(source: Anglin and Gencay, 1996). The following variables are available: 
 
price  (P): sale price of a house 
lotsize  (LOT): the lot size of a property in square feet 
bedrooms  (BED): number of bedrooms 
bathrms  (BATH): number of full bathrooms 
stories  (STO): number of stories excluding basement 
driveway  (DRI): dummy, 1 if the house has a driveway 
recroom  (RER): dummy, 1 if the house has a recreational room 
fullbase  (FIB): dummy, 1 if the house has a full finished basement 
gashw  (GWH): dummy, 1 if the house uses gas for hot water heating 
airco  (CAC): dummy, 1 if there is central air conditioning 
garagepl  (GAR): number of garage places  
prefarea  (PRN): dummy, 1 if located in preferred neighbourhood of the city 
 
 
Summary statistics:     
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
price  546 68121.6 26702.67 25000 190000 
lotsize  546 5150.266 2168.159 1650 16200 
bedrooms  546 2.965201  .7373879 1 6 
bathrms  546 1.285714  .5021579 1 4 
stories  546 1.807692  .8682025 1 4 
driveway  546  .8589744  .3483672 0 1 
recroom  546  .1776557  .3825731 0 1 
fullbase  546  .3498168  .4773493 0 1 
gashw  546  .0457875  .2092157 0 1 
airco  546  .3168498  .4656750 0 1 
garagepl  546  .6923077  .8613066 0 3 
prefarea  546  .2344322  .4240319 0 1 
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II) Estimation Results 
 
  Source     SS df MS Number of obs = 546
----------------- --------------------------------------------------- F( 11,   534) = 105.03
       Model 51.5755541 11 4.68868673 Prob > F = 0.0000
    Residual 23.8376161 534 .044639731 R-squared = 0.6839
----------------- --------------------------------------------------- Adj R-squared = 0.6774
    Total 75.4131702 545 .138372789 Root MSE = 0.21128
ln_price Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
  ln_lotsize  .3129159  .0269214 11.62 0.000  .260031  .3658007
 ln_bedrooms  .0887915  .0437256 2.03 0.043  .0028962  .1746868
  ln_bathrms  .2637722  .0312154 8.45 0.000  .2024521  .3250923
  ln_stories  .1652339  .024935 6.63 0.000  .1162513  .2142166
    driveway  .1095447  .0283597 3.86 0.000  .0538344  .165255
     recroom  .059703  .0261513 2.28 0.023  .0083309  .1110751
    fullbase  .0956443  .0216553 4.42 0.000  .0531043  .1381843
       gashw  .1733505  .044116 3.93 0.000  .0866883  .2600126
       airco  .1707837  .0212669 8.03 0.000  .1290066  .2125608
    garagepl  .048916  .0115416 4.24 0.000  .0262436  .0715884
    prefarea  .1296759  .0227795 5.69 0.000  .0849275  .1744243
       _cons 7.920482  .2191781 36.14 0.000 7.489925 8.351039
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Ramsey RESET test by using powers of the fitted values of  ln_price 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 531) =      0.76 
                  Prob > F =      0.5184 
 
test  ln_lotsize = 1 
F(  1,   534) =  651.36 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
test ln_bedrooms = 1 
F(  1,   534) =  434.27 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
test  ln_bathrms = 1 
F(  1,   534) =  556.27 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
test  ln_stories = 1 
F(  1,   534) = 1120.76 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of ln_price 
         chi2(1)      =     0.51 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4761 
 
    Variable VIF 1/VIF 
  ln_stories 1.56 0.640629
 ln_bedrooms 1.51 0.663440
  ln_lotsize 1.40 0.713723
    fullbase 1.30 0.766523
  ln_bathrms 1.26 0.791675
     recroom 1.22 0.818292
    garagepl 1.21 0.828859
       airco 1.20 0.835121
    driveway 1.19 0.839165
    prefarea 1.14 0.877891
       gashw 1.04 0.961490
    Mean VIF 1.28
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Furthermore, by deleting four severe outliers (where the studentized residuals 
in absolute value were higher than 3), the model also overcomes the test for 
the normal distribution of residuals: 
 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                          ------- joint ------ 
    Variable  Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
   Residuals  542 0.1020 0.3541 3.53 0.1708 
 
 
